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Abstract 
 
Several developing countries that underwent trade liberalization experienced changes in 
the share of informal workers in manufacturing industries. This phenomenon deserves careful 
examination because informal jobs are not only generally viewed as low-quality and low-paying 
jobs, they also account for more than 30% of the workforce in some countries. In this paper, I 
develop a theoretical model of the impacts of trade liberalization on labor markets in which 
domestic and foreign import tariffs affect firms’ payroll tax compliance decisions, which in turn 
determine the types of jobs (i.e., formal or informal) created. The model is able to replicate 
several stylized facts such as some small firms hiring formal and informal workers and large 
firms hiring only formal workers. Moreover, it predicts that a decrease in domestic import 
tariffs decreases both the share of informal workers and the average formal wage, whereas a 
decrease in foreign (i.e., trading partner) import tariffs decreases the informality share but 
increases the average formal wage. The effect on the average informal wage is ambiguous.  
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Introduction 
The existence of jobs that do not meet legal requirements (hereafter called informal 
jobs) is a common phenomenon worldwide (Schneider and Enste, 2000), and in developing 
countries they account for a significant share of the workforce, for instance at least 30% of all 
jobs in Brazil and Colombia are informal. Although job informality is also a relevant topic for 
Southern European economies (Schneider, 2012), a significant part of the job informality 
literature has focused on Latin American countries due to data availability. 
Trade liberalization episodes in Latin America were accompanied by almost no change in 
the industry share of employment as found by Hanson and Harrison (1999) for Mexico and by 
Pavcnik et al. (2004) for Brazil. Another significant feature was a substantial increase in the 
share of informal workers in the manufacturing sector (Perry et al., 2007). This last 
phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 1, which indicates that the share of informal workers in 
Brazil’s manufacturing sector increased from 12% to 20.4% following the country’s trade 
liberalization in 1990, whereas the share of informal workers in the services sector remained 
stable. In light of these facts, labor informality may be a relevant margin of adjustment to trade 
policy changes and therefore deserves a careful investigation. 
<<< Figure 1 goes here >>> 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical model in which trade policy 
changes affect the firm’s decision to offer formal or informal jobs. This means that firms choose 
whether to comply with labor regulations or not, particularly the payroll tax, which appears to 
be the key difference between formal and informal labor contracts in Latin America. Thus, 
government payroll tax revenues represent an important additional channel through which 
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trade liberalization affects welfare.  
To do so, in this paper I present a small open economy version of the Davis and Harrigan 
(2011) “Good Jobs, Bad Jobs” model, in which the firm’s payroll tax compliance decision is 
embedded. Next, I conduct comparative statics to evaluate the effect of changes in domestic 
and trade partner import tariffs on the industry-level share of informal workers, and average 
formal and informal wages, which are the outcomes examined in the empirical studies such as 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) and Paz (2012). To briefly summarize the theoretical results, a 
domestic import tariff reduction lead to a decrease in the share of informal workers and in the 
average formal wage. A trade partner import tariff reduction also leads to a reduction in the 
share of informal workers, but it increases the average formal worker wage. The effect of both 
tariffs on the average informal wage cannot be determined.  
This paper is closely related to Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) and Alemán-Castilla (2006). 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) developed a representative firm model in which only formal 
workers have firing costs, whereas informal workers have a higher marginal cost for the firm. As 
a result, informal workers are employed in order to accommodate demand fluctuations. They 
found that a reduction in import tariffs results implies a mean decrease in the demand 
distribution, which leads to a decrease in formal employment and an increase in the share of 
informal workers.  
Alemán-Castilla (2006) assumed that firms have a boost in productivity and access to 
foreign markets by hiring formal workers, i.e. by complying with the payroll tax. And this is 
embedded in Melitz’s (2003) heterogeneous firm model. As a result, compliance with payroll 
tax is not profitable for small firms, and changes in trade policy have an ambiguous effect on 
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the informality share.  
My paper improves on previous studies in several important aspects. First, by assuming 
wage heterogeneity, my theoretical model is able to replicate several informal labor market 
stylized facts, including that informal workers are used because they are cheaper than formal 
workers, some small firms hire formal workers, and in equilibrium firms that hire formal 
workers will be larger on average. Second, I am able to obtain testable predictions regarding 
the effect of trade liberalization on the average wages. Third, due to definition of informality 
used here, my theoretical model is closely linked to the empirical literature such as Goldberg 
and Pavcnik (2003), Alemán-Castilla (2006), and Paz (2012).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
model. In section 3 I conduct the comparative statics exercises to obtain testable predictions in 
the form of propositions, whose proofs appear in the Appendix. Next, I present the welfare 
implications of the model, and discuss the model extension to the two large asymmetric 
economy case. In section 4 the links between the theoretical model testable predictions and 
the empirical literature findings are discussed. Finally, I offer some conclusions in section 5.  
 
2. The Theoretical model 
 
 This section begins with a brief discussion of stylized facts concerning informal labor 
markets that are taken into account in the theoretical model design. Next, I discuss the core of 
the theoretical model - the payroll tax and its enforcement framework - which is then 
introduced into a general equilibrium international trade model.  
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2.1 Informal labor markets: stylized facts 
A large strand of the literature defines informality as being based solely on compliance 
with regulations. For example, Schneider and Enste (2000) define the informal economy as the 
“legal value-added creating activities which are not taxed or registered and where the largest 
part can be classified as clandestine labor, which means that unpaid or `pure' household 
production, voluntary nonprofit (social) services and criminal activities are excluded”.1 According 
to Portes et al. (1989, p.30) “the best-known economic effect of the informalization process is to 
reduce the costs of labor substantially”. Among these labor costs, the payroll tax is the largest, 
typically accounting for 15 to 30% of the wage.2 Furthermore, whether firms comply with the 
payroll tax is arguably central to the root distinction between formal and informal jobs in 
Argentina (Pratap and Quentin, 2006) and Brazil (Neri, 2002), for the simple reason that in both 
cases employers tend to follow other labor regulations. Thus, I define an informal job as an 
employment relationship in which the employer does not comply with the payroll tax. This 
definition has two important strengths. First, it can be used both theoretically and empirically, 
since payroll tax compliance information is available in surveys. Second, this measure is also 
comparable across countries because payroll taxes are used throughout the world. 
Using the above definition of informality, the first stylized fact is concerned with the 
increase in labor informality in Latin America discussed previously. This increase can be due to 
changes in the composition of employment across or within manufacturing industries. Goldberg 
                                                          
1
 In contrast, the International Labor Organization (ILO, 2002) defines informal jobs as those offered by firms with 
five or less workers. But this definition does not distinguish jobs according to workers’ different welfare levels. 
2
 Schneider and Enste (2000) provide an in-depth discussion of the factors influencing regulation compliance. 
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and Pavcnik (2003) find that within-industry variation accounted for almost all variation in 
Colombia (1984-1998) and about 85% of the variation in Brazil (1987-1998). Paz (2012) used a 
different sample for Brazil (1989-2001) and also found that the within-industry change in 
informality accounted for 85% of the variation in informality. 
The second stylized fact is that informal jobs are more prominent among firms that 
employ few workers, as reported by Pratap and Quintin (2006) and Neri (2002), for Argentina 
and Brazil, respectively. From Table 1 we can see that in Brazil although informal workers are 
more likely to be found in small establishments, some small establishments still employ formal 
workers, while larger establishments are much more likely to employ formal workers. According 
to Ellery and Gomes (2007), the large establishments are also responsible for almost all 
Brazilian manufacturing exports. This strongly suggests that informal workers are not used for 
producing exported goods. 
From Table 2 comes the third stylized fact that in Brazil every manufacturing industry 
has informal workers, and the share of informal workers is different across industries. Paz 
(2012) points out that it is commonly highlighted in the literature, e.g. Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2003) and Alemán-Castilla (2006), that informal workers are different from formal workers in 
terms of age, gender, and schooling. This claim is usually supported by evidence consisting of 
highly aggregated data at the manufacturing level. However, a closer examination of 
manufacturing data for Brazil disaggregated at the industry level reveals a somewhat different 
picture (see Table 2). This leads to the fourth stylized fact. Table 2 figures reveal that the 
average characteristics of formal and informal workers (years of education, age, and gender) 
are similar in some industries, such as apparel, but slightly different in others, such as 
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nonmetallic mineral products. So, formal and informal workers are not much different with 
respect to those observable characteristics. 
The idea that formal workers are not very different from informal workers receives 
additional support from Table 3 makes the fifth and last stylized fact. Table 3 presents evidence 
that workers in Brazil switched between formal and informal jobs between 1991 and 1996, in 
particular, approximately one sixth of people employed in the formal market in 1991 switched 
to the informal market in 1996, while approximately one third of the workers in the informal 
market in 1991 migrated to the formal labor market in 1996. Tables 2 and 3 suggest that 
informality is not determined exclusively by either worker or industry-specific characteristics. 
 
2.2 Model set-up 
 
2.2.1 Payroll Tax Mechanism 
The model assumes that firms are risk neutral and choose whether or not to comply 
with payroll taxes based on their expected profits. In either case, firm i has to pay its workers a 
wage Wi. However, if the firm complies with payroll taxes (i.e., establishes a formal labor 
contract), it pays an ad valorem payroll tax (t) and a per worker administrative cost (), which 
encompasses the costs of calculating, preparing and keeping tax records.3 Thus, the cost of a 
formal worker for firm i is bi
for = TWi +  , with T  1+t.
 4  
If a firm is caught employing informal workers, it has to pay an ad valorem fine , based 
                                                          
3
 Evans (2003) provides evidence about the large private costs of tax compliance. Boisvert et al. (2001) found that 
in the case of Brazil, these preparation costs can be substantial, ranging from 43 to 86 dollars per worker, or 
between 15 and 30% of the prevailing minimum monthly wage. 
4
 The tax formula used here is the one used in practice in Brazil, as determined by Laws 8212 and 9876. 
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on the wage paid to each informal worker. Every firm is audited with probability . The 
expected cost of an informal worker fir firm i is bi
inf = Wi with 1+. The payroll tax 
revenues and fines collected are returned via lump-sum transfer to all unemployed and 
employed (formal and informal) workers. 
The likelihood of a payroll tax audit depends on the government’s ability to detect the 
existence of firms. An exporting firm can be easily detected because the government monitors 
the borders, and the trade flow information can then be matched to payroll tax data, 
uncovering any evasion. Thus exporters are certain to be audited ( = 1). This enforcement 
framework makes it unprofitable for exporting firms to employ informal workers. Furthermore, 
the government will also know that the exporter serves the domestic market, which rules out 
the possibility of the firm employing formal workers for export orders and informal workers for 
domestic orders. However, a firm serving only the domestic market has to be found (i.e., it is 
harder to detect), so the audit likelihood is smaller ( 1  ).5 
Figure 2 shows the formal and informal expected wage bill functions for   . A 
formal worker is cheaper than an informal worker for firm i if its respective wage is Wi >   
/(-T). Notice that the wage cutoff () is decreasing in  and , which means that either an 
increase in the fine or an increase in the likelihood of an audit will decrease the cutoff. On the 
other hand, an increase in either one of the payroll taxes leads to an increase in the cutoff. 
These properties are consistent with findings that both taxation and its enforcement are 
determinants of informal economy (cf. Schneider and Enste, 2000). When  = 1 a formal worker 
                                                          
5
 It seems reasonable that the audit probability should increase with firm size. However, this would make 
calculations more cumbersome, and the results would not be qualitatively different. Moreover, in equilibrium, the 
probability will differ according to firm size, i.e. it is one for large firms and   ̅for smaller firms. 
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will always be cheaper, and no firms will offer informal labor contracts. 
In order to generate the stylized fact that every industry has a positive share of informal 
workers, the model’s payroll tax framework requires within-industry wage heterogeneity. And 
to replicate the fact that small firms are more likely to hire informal workers, but that some 
small firms do hire formal workers, the wage heterogeneity also has to be present across firms 
with the same level of employment. This last condition is corroborated by Schmidt and 
Zimmermann (1991), who find that there is still wage heterogeneity even after controlling for 
firm size and worker characteristics.6 
The Melitz (2003) heterogeneous firm model has several extensions that allow for 
heterogeneous wages. Among them, Kreickemeier and Egger (2009), Helpman, Itskhoki, and 
Redding (2008), and Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) feature wages that are proportional to firm 
size. If the payroll tax mechanism proposed here is applied to these models, all small firms will 
hire only informal workers, which is not supported by the findings discussed earlier. 
Fortunately, the Davis and Harrigan (2011) extension of the Melitz model allows firms 
with the same employment level to pay different wages, which means that among firms with 
the same level of employment some hire formal workers and others hire informal workers.7 
This is so because firms differ in terms of productivity and worker monitoring ability (i.e., the 
employer ability to detect a worker that is shirking her duties). The latter generates wage 
heterogeneity through an efficiency wage motive (see e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984).  
                                                          
6
 Abowd et al. (1999) used a panel of French firms and workers and found that most of the inter-industry wage 
differential is due to person effects and not firm effects. Nevertheless, there is still some variation that could not 
be explained. To the best of my knowledge, there is no similar study conducted in a developing country using 
formal and informal workers that could discipline the theoretical model design. 
7
 A shortcoming of the Davis and Harrigan model is that the firm-specific wage does not change with the firm 
profits, contrary to what was found by Amiti and Davis (2011) in Indonesia. 
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According to Dasgupta and Ray (1986) and Ray (1998), efficiency wages in developing 
countries are motivated by the fact that workers’ physical strength (provided and determined 
by her nourishment) affects their effort level, so different monitoring abilities could be 
interpreted as different effort requirements.8 Hence, a higher wage implies better nourishment 
and thus the worker is able to exert more effort. 
Thus, I embed the payroll tax framework into the Davis and Harrigan (2011) model, 
which is described next. The world economy consists of two countries Home and Foreign 
(indicated by "*"). Each country has a one-sector economy where firms produce horizontally-
differentiated goods indexed by . It is assumed that homogeneous labor is the only factor 
of production. Home is a small open economy (SOE) in the sense of Demidova and Rodriguez-
Clare (2011), i.e. its policies do not affect Foreign except for the trade flow between the two 
countries.9  
 
2.2.2 Wage Heterogeneity 
Workers are risk-neutral, have identical preferences, and their income comes from the 
wages (W) and the governmental lump-sum transfers (tr). It is assumed that there is no 
unemployment benefit and workers have no benefit from the payroll taxes.10 This means that 
workers are ex-ante indifferent between formal and informal jobs. However, the type of jobs in 
                                                          
8
 The effort level is also called labor power, and can include mental strength. 
9
 This notion of small open economy is also present in Davies and Paz’s (2011) simplified version of the Melitz 
(2003) model. 
10
 In many developing countries, social security is a pay-as-you-go system, in which workers tend to see their 
contributions as simply a tax because the benefits they receive are not related to the contributions they make. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that workers are indeed benefiting from social security benefits, since the rate of 
return of the social security contributions may be smaller than the risk-free asset return. 
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the economy does matter for the workers’ welfare because of the government transfer 
received, which is taken as given by the worker. The indirect utility of a worker (Vi) employed at 
firm i,  
  (         )  {
(     ) 
   
(
  
 
   )     
                         
               
                          
                       
   (1) 
where e is the effort exerted by the worker and is measured in the same units as the wage, and 
P is the consumer price index that comes from the standard Dixit-Stiglitz CES aggregate of 
differentiated goods. 
A worker can lose her job due to exogenous firm death, which affects every firm equally 
with probability , or by being caught shirking her duties with a firm-specific hazard rate 
   (   ̅ , in which ̅  is the maximum monitoring ability.
11  
The derivation of the solution for this efficiency wage problem is similar to Davis and 
Harrigan (2011), and thus omitted here.12 In the solution of the efficiency wage problem, W1 is 
defined to be the efficiency wage paid by the firm with the maximum monitoring ability ( ̅), as 
a result, W1 will be lowest wage paid. The efficiency wages associated with the other 
monitoring ability levels are given by a monotonically decreasing relationship between Wi and 
mi, as shown by equation (2). So, all wages are proportional to W1, and when W1 changes, all 
wages at Home change proportionately. Moreover, Firm-specific real and nominal wages are in 
a constant ratio that depends inversely on the firm level relative monitoring abilities as well as 
common parameters. This can be readily seen by calculating the ratio between equation (2) 
                                                          
11
 As in Davis and Harrigan (2011), I also assume the following parameter restriction     (   )  This condition 
is satisfied as long as the exogenous job loss likelihood and the utility penalty of effort are small.  
12
 The efficiency wage problem is derived in the Appendix for the referees. 
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evaluated at two different wage levels. 
   
   ̅   
    (   )
, with 
   
   
        (2) 
Equation (2) also allows firms to be fully characterized by the joint distribution of wages 
and productivity, (I,Wi). Notice that the support of the wage distribution depends on W1, but 
it is just a scale parameter that can be factored out, given that the ratio among wages is 
constant. The solution to the efficiency wage problem provides one more equation that relates 
the unemployment level (u) to the expected wage distortion,  (     ), which will be 
discussed in detail in the general equilibrium subsection. This relationship is depicted by 
equation (3), where    [
 ̅ (   )
 ̅ (   ) 
] is a constant given e. 
   [
   (
  
  
)
      (
  
  
)
]        (3) 
 
2.2.3 Firm Profit Maximization Problem 
Home has a measure M of active firms and for Foreign the mass of active firms is given 
by M*. The mass of firms is endogenous only for Home given the SOE assumption. When a firm 
is born, it has to pay a one-time fixed entry cost (fe units of labor) to find out its monitoring 
ability and productivity (mi, i) and then decide whether or not to enter the market. If it decides 
to operate and supply only the domestic market, it will incur a per-period fixed cost (f units of 
labor) and a variable cost related to the output level. If the firm decides to serve the foreign 
market, in addition to the variable cost that corresponds to the units exported, it incurs a per-
period fixed export cost (fx units of labor), and the Foreign country import tariff, with *  1 + 
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Foreign import tariff > 1.13 In this heterogeneous firms type of models, the generally-accepted 
fact that only a small share of firms exports is ensured by assuming the sufficient condition 
(*)-1fx > f, which is used by Melitz (2003, p. 1709). Another result of this assumption is that 
every exporting firm will also serve the domestic market.  
Following Davis and Harrigan (2011), I assume that the fixed costs fe, f, and fx consist of 
activities performed by workers receiving a wage of W1, and the per worker cost of accounting 
 consists of  units of labor that also receive wage W1. The wage paid to these workers do not 
suffer payroll tax incidence, whereas the workers related to the variable cost activities receive 
the efficiency wage, Wi, and are hired using formal or informal labor contracts. In order to have 
formal and informal jobs coexisting in the same industry, I further assume that  > -T > 0, 
which guarantees the existence of an interval in which the expected wage bill of an informal 
worker is smaller than the expected wage bill of a formal worker. 
The last element of the firm profit maximization problem is the output demand that 
comes from the consumer expenditure minimization problem,  
    [
   
 
]
  
          (4) 
where qi,d is the quantity of firm i’s output that is demanded domestically at price pi,d. As in Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977), Q is the aggregate production level of the economy,   (0,1) is the 
parameter of the workers’ utility CES aggregator, and   (1-)-1 is the elasticity of substitution 
across goods. Firm i's labor requirement for the variable cost activity is given by qi,d/i and its 
domestic market profit when employing formal workers (   
   
) is 
                                                          
13
 * can also be interpreted as an iceberg type of variable export cost (e.g. transportation and insurance costs). 
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      (5) 
The profit maximization problem for a firm that employs informal workers is analogous 
to the case for formal workers. If the firm decides to export, it always finds cheaper to employ 
only formal workers. The foreign demand for a Home made variety is given by  
     (    )
  
   
where     (  )    and is constant due to the SOE assumption. The profit from exporting is 
given by equation (6). 
                          
   
   
  
          (6) 
Consequently, firms have to choose between staying out of the market due to negative 
profits, producing only for domestic consumers using informal workers, producing only for 
domestic consumers using formal workers, or producing for domestic and foreign consumers 
using formal workers. Firm i's ex post profit is given by },,,0max{ ,,,
inf
,
for
xi
for
di
for
didii   . 
 
2.2.4 General equilibrium 
In this subsection, I present and discuss the equations needed to solve for the general 
equilibrium of the model. First, let’s define the inverse of firm i's marginal cost as sii/bi(Wi,i). 
The entry cutoff (sopen) is the inverse of the marginal cost at which firms make zero profit, so 
firms with si < sopen do not operate. Similarly, the inverse of the marginal cost that provides zero 
profit from exporting is defined as ]},max[:inf{ inf,,,,, di
for
di
for
xi
for
diiforx ss   , which takes 
into account not only whether formal firms decide to serve foreign markets, but also the export 
decision of informal firms that have to switch to formal workers in order to supply foreign 
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markets.  
Figure 3 shows the cutoffs in the wage-productivity space. The diagonal lines represents 
s and its slope is the marginal cost (b/). Notice that the active firms will be on the right side of 
the sopen curve, and the firms on the left exit the market as soon as they learn their pair (mi,i). 
The exporters, which are larger in size and productivity, are located to the right of sx,for. The 
informal firms are located inside the polygon ABCD. Since the difference between the informal 
and formal wage bills decreases in Wi, the segment AB belongs to the line TWi+ = i/sx,for. The 
employment level is constant along the s line. This means that small firms, the ones with s close 
to sopen, can either hire formal or informal workers depending on the wage paid. This matches 
the second stylized fact discussed earlier. 
Let G(s) Pr[Ss] be the cumulative distribution function of s, with its density given by 
g(s), and, following Melitz (2003), the  -1 uncentered moment of g(s) is assumed to be finite. 
So, the probability of a firm being an exporter, i.e. its inverse marginal cost being larger than 
the export cutoff, is given by Pr(s > sx,for)=1-G(sx,for). Let's define  ̃( ) as a measure of aggregate 
inverse marginal costs for firms with si ≥ s,  
1
1
)(
)(1
1
)(~ 1






 



 dssGs
sG
ss
s


       (7) 
The endogenous variables that need to be solved for in general equilibrium are sopen, 
sx,for, s*x,for, W1, M, P, Q, E(Wi/mi), u, and tr. The first equation needed for the general 
equilibrium is equation (8) that Melitz (2003) called the free entry condition (FE), which states 
that a sufficient mass of ex ante identical firms enters the market so that the expected profit 
from entry equals the fixed cost of entry. 
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 (     )     (      )                (8) 
with  ( )      ( )  ( ̃( )  )      . 
Equation (9) is the zero profit cutoff condition for entry. It requires the marginal entrant 
to have zero profits, i.e. the variable profit (v) must be equal to the per period fixed cost of 
production. 
  
 (     )   
  (       )
              (9) 
Equation (10) is the zero cutoff profit for exporting, and it means that for the marginal 
entrant in the Foreign market the variable profit from exporting has to equal the fixed cost of 
exporting.  
  
 (      )   
  (         
 )               (10) 
Similarly for the Foreign exporter, the zero profit cutoff for entering the Home market 
must equal the fixed cost of exporting, as depicted in equation (11). Notice that I set  
  1 to 
be the numeraire. 
  
   (      
 )     (        
   )       
        (11) 
From the ratio between equation (9) and equation (11), a relationship emerges between 
the Home entry cutoff and the Foreign export cutoff as shown by equation (12). 
      
        (      )
 
           (12) 
Next, the static nature of the model requires balanced trade flows. Thus, sales from 
Home to Foreign must be equal to the sales from Foreign to Home, as depicted by equation 
(13). 
 
   (     )
∫ (     )      ( )  
  
    (     
 )
∫ (     )       ( )
 
     
 
 
     
 (13) 
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where the price index faced by the Home consumer is given by  
     
 
   (     )
∫ (  )     ( )  
  
    (     
 )
∫ (    )      ( )
 
     
 
 
     
 (14) 
The labor force (L) is divided into unemployed workers (U), workers in the fixed entry 
cost sector (Le), workers in per-period fixed cost activities (Lf), workers in per-period export 
fixed cost activities (Lx), formal workers in variable cost activities (Lv,for), and informal workers in 
variable cost activities (Lv,inf). 
In the steady state, the mass of active firms does not change, so the mass of entrants 
should be enough to replace the firms that experienced a negative shock and exited the 
market, so Le = Mfe. The level of employment in the per-period fixed cost activity is L
f = Mf, and 
the level of employment in the per-period export fixed cost activity is Lx = [1-G(sx,for)]Mfx. The 
labor market clearing condition is given by: 
(   )  
    
   (     )
     [   (      )]   (   ) 
             (15) 
Where  
       ∫ ∫
   
 
 (   )    
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
     (    )
 ∫ ∫
    
 
 (   )    
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
     (    )
 ∫ ∫
        
 
 (   )    
  
      
 
  
 
  
     (    )
     (     )
 ∫ ∫
        
 
 (   )    
 
  
 
     (    )
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       ∫ ∫
   
 
 (   )    
 
      
  
       
     (     )
 ∫ ∫
   
 
 (   )    
 
  
(     )     
       
 ∫ ∫
   
 
 (   )    
 
 
      
 
 
 
(    )     
(     )     
 
The next step is to calculate the expected wage distortion. To do so, let (i|s*) be the 
probability distribution function of active firms, in which the firm type is given by i(,m) and 
this density also depended on the entry and export cutoffs. The employment weighted average 
wage distortion per unit of mass of active firms is  
 (
  
  
)  (
   
   (     )
       (      )      
     )
  
 ̅
 ∫
     
    
 ( |     )   
 ∫
      
    
 ( |      )           (16) 
The per capita government transfer is given by the sum of collected payroll taxes and 
the expected value of the fines, where ̅    is the average formal wage and infw  is the average 
informal wage, 
   
  ̅            ̅         
 
        (17) 
The last equation needed comes from the efficiency wage problem and relates the 
unemployment rate to the expected wage distortion and W1, equation (3).  
Similarly to Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2011), by recursive substitution the general 
equilibrium ends up depending upon W1 and sx,for only. This is so, because all the other 
endogenous variables can be written as a function of both of them. So the general equilibrium 
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problem collapses to equation (10) and equation (18) that is a modified version of equation 
(13). 
 (        )
   (     )
∫ (
  
  
)
   
   ( )  
 
     
   
 
  
          
 (        ) 
∫ [
  (        ) 
 
]
   
 (         )  
 ( )
 
     (        )
   (18) 
 
Proposition 1:  There exists a solution to the system of equations (10) and (18) and it is 
unique.14  
 
3 Comparative statics 
 
The analysis conducted here is a comparative steady state analysis, in which I assess the 
effects of changes in Home and Foreign import tariffs on the share of informal workers and on 
the average formal and informal wages. The effects of these changes on the ex ante workers’ 
welfare are discussed next. Finally, I show how the results are altered when Home and Foreign 
become two large and asymmetric economies.  
The share of informal workers is defined as              (             ). This is the 
most common measure used in the literature because given the usual belief that workers 
prefer formal to informal jobs, its increase would mean a reduction in workers’ welfare. The 
average formal and informal wages not only allow for evaluation of changes in wage inequality 
                                                          
14
 The proof of this proposition is similar to Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2011), hence it is omitted here. 
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between average formal and informal workers, but are also an important and easily measurable 
component of worker welfare. The share of informal workers and the average formal and 
informal wages are very convenient measures because they are expressed as ratios. And this 
simplifies considerably the derivations since the general equilibrium effects on P, Q, and M do 
not matter for the sign of the derivatives.  
 
3.1 Effects of a reduction in Home import tariffs 
A reduction in Home import tariffs () affects only the trade balance condition, equation 
(18). From Lemma 1 in Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2011), for a fixed export cutoff (sx,for) the 
fall in Home import tariff forces a reduction in Home wages, 
   
  
  . Remember that the ratio 
between wages (Wi) and W1 is always constant, so in this case, a decrease in W1 makes every 
Home wage at Home to decrease proportionally, and the formal-informal cutoff () also 
changes proportionately The reduction in W1 in equation (10) leads to a decrease in sx,for 
(
      
  
  ), which is equivalent to an increase in the marginal cost export cutoff, the sx,for line 
rotates to the left in Figure 3. 
The free entry condition, equation (8), implies that sopen moves in the opposite direction 
of sx,for, so a decrease in  leads to an increase in sopen (
      
  
  ), i.e. the sopen line rotates to 
the right in Figure 3. These high cost and high price firms exit the market and that leads to a 
decrease in the price index (
  
  
  ). 
The effect of a change in Home import tariffs on the informal share is derived in 
equation (19). The decrease in the marginal cost entry cutoff induced by a reduction in Home 
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import tariff leads to a loss of both formal and informal jobs for Home firms, so the sign of the 
first term on the right-hand side of equation (19) is undetermined. The second term in the 
right-hand side of equation (19) reflects the increase in the marginal cost export cutoff  due to 
the decrease in . The Home firms in the sx,for locus with Wi <  switch from informal to formal 
workers in order to gain access to foreign markets, and firms with Wi >  hire more formal 
workers to engage in exporting. As a result, the second term of equation (19) is positive, since 
formal jobs are created and informal jobs are destroyed, thus the share of informal workers 
decreases. But the sign of 
      
  
 is ambiguous, since informal jobs are destroyed and formal 
jobs are created and destroyed. 
      
  
 
      
      
      
  
 
      
      
      
  
      (19) 
Although the model intuition is simple, its derivation quickly becomes cumbersome 
when the ambiguity concerning the sign of the share/sopen term is addressed. One way to 
obtain testable predictions is to develop (sufficient) assumptions about (i, Wi) and the model 
parameters. This leads to Proposition 2: 
 
Proposition 2. A reduction in the Home import tariff () decreases the share of informal 
workers in total industry employment if the sufficient conditions (S1)-(S4) hold, 
(  )    (  )     (  )   (   )
    (  )
  
 
   
 
 (  )
  (  )
  
   .15 
 
Condition (S1) is a consequence of the earlier assumption about the finiteness of g(s) 
                                                          
15
 The proof for Proposition 2 appears in Appendix A.1. 
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moments, and for instance it was also assumed by Helpman et al. (2004). Moreover, this 
assumption does not seem to be restrictive because the empirical estimates of  by Hummels 
(2001) and Romalis (2007) are above 3. Using data for 15 developing countries (some in Latin 
America) Broda et al. (2008) estimated the elasticity of substitution and found that across HS-4 
level varieties it has a median above 3. 
One way to solve the ambiguity is to guarantee that the number of formal jobs along 
the sx,for line (in Figure 3) is larger than the number of formal jobs along the sopen line. For this to 
happen, we need |
      
  
   
      
  
  and |
      
      
|   
      
      
 . Condition (S2) guarantees that 
that the former inequality holds, and this leads to Lemma 1. 
 
Lemma 1. A sufficient condition for |
      
  
   
      
  
  is fx = f.
16 
 
The sufficient conditions (S3) and (S4) are needed to ensure that the latter inequality 
holds. Both conditions are met if, for example, the marginal distributions are Pareto. Condition 
(S3) means that the change in probability as  is smaller in absolute value than the rate of 
employment growth as  increases. The reason of this assumption is that the formal 
employment of the firms lying on Sx,for ray is larger than the formal employment of the firms 
lying on the sopen ray, which solves the ambiguity.  
The effects of a reduction in Home import tariff on the average formal wage is 
presented in equation (20) and the average informal wage is presented in equation (21).  
                                                          
16
 The proof for Lemma 1 appears in Appendix A.1. 
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  ̅   
      
      
  
)
   
  
     (21) 
The reduction in all wages caused by the domestic import tariff leads to a decrease in 
the average formal and informal wages. Given that 
   
  
  , the sign of the derivatives will be 
determined by the sign of the expression inside the parentheses, which is in principle 
undetermined. This expression consists of the changes on entry and export cut-offs that lead to 
changes in the job composition, since the wages of the destroyed jobs are different from the 
wages of the created jobs, as shown below.  
    
  ̅   
  
      
       
      
      
  
  ̅   
      
      
      
  
 
       
      
      
  
  ̅   
      
      
      
  
     
The sign of the above expression can be determined by comparing the average formal 
wage with the average wage of the formal firms lying on the curve in which the derivative is 
calculated, in this case sopen and sx,for. For the sign to be positive, we need the average formal 
wage along sopen to be larger than  ̅    and the average formal wage along sx,for to be smaller 
than ̅     This is ensured by conditions (S1)-(S3) and (S5). This leads to the third proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. A reduction in the Home import tariff leads to a decrease in the industry-
level average formal wage if the sufficient conditions (S1)-(S3) and the additional sufficient 
condition (S5) hold, 
(  )      (
 
    
)
   
 
  (  )
  
 . 17 
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 The proof for Proposition 3 is presented in Appendix A.1. 
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Condition (S5) is more restrictive than condition (S4), and it is needed to guarantee that 
the average formal wage along sopen is larger than the average wage along sx,for. Unfortunately, 
the previous assumptions are not sufficient to prevent sign ambiguity concerning the effects of 
Home tariff changes on the average informal wage. So, unless the model is fully parameterized 
a prediction cannot be derived. 
 
3.2 Effects of a reduction in Foreign import tariffs 
Next the effect of a reduction in Foreign import tariffs on informality share and average 
formal and informal wage is investigated. From Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2011) Lemma 1 
a reduction in Foreign import tariffs (*) affects equation (10), and for a fixed export cutoff 
(sx,for) it implies that W1 has to increase, 
   
   
   . Remember that the wage ratios are always 
constant, so in this case, an increase in W1 makes every wage at Home to increase 
proportionally. The increase in W1 leads to a decrease in sx,for (
      
   
  ) through equation 
(19), which means an increase in the marginal cost export cutoff. Finally, equation (8) implies 
that sopen moves in the opposite direction of sx,for, so a decrease in  leads to an increase in sopen 
(
      
   
  ), or a decrease in the marginal cost entry cut-off, which as in the previous case leads 
to a decrease in the price index (
  
   
  ). The effect of Foreign import tariff on the Home share 
of informal workers is calculated in a similar fashion to the effect of Home import tariffs, but 
now as shown in equation (22), the derivative of the informality share with respect to *, has 
an additional term that accounts for the change in the share due to the change in the formal 
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employment of current exporters. 
      
   
 
      
      
      
   
 
      
      
      
   
 
       
   
     (22) 
So, a decrease in the foreign import tariff affects the share of informal workers by 
destroying informal jobs and creating and destroying formal jobs due to changes in the entry 
and export cut-offs (as discussed before), and now by creating more formal jobs as the result of 
the increase in the volume exported, which raises formal employment by current exporting 
firms, as depicted by the last term in the right hand side of equation (22), which is positive. 
Thus, the sign of 
      
   
  is ambiguous. But this ambiguity can be solved using a strategy similar 
to the one used in Proposition 2. This leads to Proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4. A reduction in the Foreign import tariff (*) decreases the share of 
informal workers in total industry employment if the sufficient conditions (S1)-(S4) hold.18 
 
Next, the effects of a reduction in Foreign import tariff on the Home average formal and 
informal wage are investigated, which also suffers from sign ambiguity, as shown in equation 
(23), for the effect of * on the average formal wage. 
  ̅   
   
 (
  ̅   
   
 
  ̅   
      
      
   
 
  ̅   
      
      
   
)
   
   
     (23) 
Like in Proposition 3, under conditions (S1)-(S3) and (S5) we obtain a positive sign for 
the last four terms in equation (24).  
                                                          
18
 The proof for Proposition 2 appears in Appendix A.1. 
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          (24) 
Now, we also need to have a positive sign for the first two terms, so the sign of the term 
in parentheses in equation (23) is positive. Notice that 
       
   
   and 
      
   
  . 
Furthermore, conditions (S3) and (S5) ensure that 
       
   
  ̅   
      
   
>0. Thus, 
  ̅   
   
  , i.e. 
forw  increases with a decrease in *. This leads to Proposition 5: 
 
Proposition 5: A reduction in the Foreign import tariff leads to an increase in the 
industry-level average formal wage if the conditions (S1)-(S3) and (S5) hold.19 
 
As before, the previous assumptions are not sufficient to prevent sign ambiguity 
concerning the effects of tariff changes on the average informal wage. 
 
3.3 Welfare Analysis 
The welfare analysis conducted here consists of contrasting the workers’ ex ante 
welfare at two different steady states. Welfare changes during the transition between steady 
states cannot be evaluated because the adjustment path is not contemplated by the theoretical 
model. 
 The workers’ ex ante welfare is affected by the price index, the government transfers, 
                                                          
19
 The proof for Proposition 4 is presented in Appendix A.1. 
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and the expected wage, which depends on the distribution of active firms and unemployment. 
All these three factors are affected by changes in Home and Foreign import tariffs.  
 A decrease in the Home import tariff leads to a decrease in the price index, which 
improves the workers’ welfare. This change in tariff also reduces the informality share, which 
affects workers’ welfare through the government transfers, in the sense that higher informality 
leads to lower government transfers, all else equal. But the effect on unemployment and on the 
overall average wage is undetermined. As a result, it is not clear whether workers’ ex ante 
welfare increases or decreases. A similar analysis is applicable to a decrease in Foreign import 
tariff, but again, the total effect on the ex ante welfare cannot be determined. 
 
3.4 Two Large and Asymmetric Economies case 
The theoretical model can be extended to the case of two large asymmetric economies. 
Now, the mass of firms on Foreign becomes endogenous, and the Foreign demand for Home 
products will depend on the now endogenous P* and Q*. This means that changes in Home 
economy will affect the Foreign economy. As discussed in Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare 
(2011), the comparative statics of this version of the model gets extremely cumbersome, to the 
point that it is not even possible to figure out what happens with sx,for when tariffs change. I 
present in Appendix A.2 the equations needed to solve for the general equilibrium in the case 
of two large asymmetric economies. 
 
4. Discussion 
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In this section I contrast the propositions from theoretical model with the findings from 
the empirical studies about the effect of domestic and trade partner import tariff reductions on 
the industry-level share of informal workers and average formal and informal wages.  
The empirical evidence of the effects of domestic import tariff reduction is mixed. 
Alemán-Castilla (2006) found no effect in Mexico, and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) also found 
no effect for Colombia and Brazil. On the other hand, Paz (2012) found that a decrease in 
domestic tariffs increased informality share in Brazil. This result was also found by Acosta and 
Montes-Rojas (2010) using Argentinean data.20  
 Both results contradict Proposition 2. But this fact does not rule against the theoretical 
model because it has ambiguous predictions at first. And it is not clear which of conditions (S1)-
(S4) used to derive proposition 2 is the culprit for such failure. Intuitively,  both the lack of 
effect and the increase in informality share can be generated whenever the net formal job loss 
is equal or exceeds the informal job destruction. One possibility is to have very few firms 
exporting due to a very high fixed exporting cost, which could be the case in these countries 
aforementioned, since their trade exposure is small. Another possibility is to have the marginal 
density of productivity to decrease very fast as productivity increases. 21  
 Alemán-Castilla (2006) and Paz (2012) are the only studies that assessed the effects of a 
trade partner import tariff reduction. They found that it decreased the informality share as 
predicted by Proposition 4. Remember that conditions (S1)-(S4) are sufficient conditions, and in 
particular, in the proof of Proposition 4 the fact that a decrease trade partner import tariff 
                                                          
20
 Notice that only Paz (2012) empirical strategy takes into account the potential endogeneity between of tariffs 
and informality share due to the effects of both policies on government revenues. 
21
 But the calculations to determine such speed are very cumbersome and require the specification of a functional 
form for the marginal density of productivity. 
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increase formal employment of the current exporters was not used. This means that the 
sufficient conditions can be relaxed to some extent and the result will remain. 
Paz (2012) investigated the effects of tariff changes on the average formal and informal 
wages in Brazil. His estimates imply that a decrease in domestic import tariffs decreases the 
average formal wage, as predicted by Proposition 3. A similar change in the trade partner’s 
import tariff increases the average formal wage by 0.32%, which supports the result from 
Proposition 5. For the average informal wage, he found that it increases with a reduction in 
import tariff and decreases with a reduction in the trade partner’s import tariffs. In sum, of the 
four testable predictions generated by the theoretical model, the empirical evidence supports 
three of them. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Recent trade liberalization episodes in developing countries were accompanied by 
changes in the share of informal jobs, which are commonly seen as low wage and quality jobs, 
and also cause payroll tax evasion.  
To shed some light on this important issue, this paper presented a novel theoretical 
model of a small open economy in which trade policy affects firms’ payroll tax compliance, 
which is the major determinant of whether jobs are formal or informal. In particular, I focus on 
the effects of trade policy changes on the share of informal jobs but also the average formal 
and informal wages. 
The theoretical model predicts that a decrease in import tariffs reduces the share of 
 30 
 
informal workers, and a decrease in the trade partner’s import tariff also reduces the 
informality share. Additionally, an import tariff reduction decreases the average formal wage, 
whereas a decrease in the trade partner’s import tariff increases the average formal wage. The 
last three results received strong support from empirical studies such as Alemán-Castilla (2006) 
and Paz (2012). Nevertheless, the effect on the average informal wage is ambiguous.  
One interesting direction for future research would use the theoretical model to 
investigate the effect of a government revenue-neutral switch from payroll tax to consumption 
tax on the informality outcomes studied in this paper. 
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Table 1 – Employment shares in Brazil, by firm employment level and formality status. 
 
 
 
Source: Brazilian 1989 and 1999 PNAD data.  
Notes: An informal worker is one whose employer does not comply with payroll taxes.  
The data is presented at the most disaggregated level available.  
The question about firm employment level is included in the PNAD survey only in selected years.  
 
 
 Year 
 1989 1999 
Number of 
employees 
Formal 
share 
Informal 
share 
Formal 
share 
Informal 
share 
2 0.20 0.83 0.45 1.50 
3 to 5 2.27 3.41 3.33 5.82 
6 to 10 3.21 2.05 6.17 4.19 
11 or more 82.05 5.97 69.50 9.04 
Total 87.74 12.26 79.45 20.55 
 36 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics of worker characteristics in Brazil, by industry 
 
 Share of informal workers Average informal worker characteristics Average formal worker characteristics 
Industry  Average Std. dev. Min Max Education Age Share of males Education Age Share of males 
Nonmetallic Mineral Product  0.288 0.027 0.242 0.344 4.10 27.03 0.92 5.97 32.45 0.88 
Metals Production and Processing  0.122 0.050 0.063 0.205 6.12 28.49 0.92 7.25 33.05 0.89 
Machinery, Equipment and 
Commercial Installation  0.078 0.040 0.034 0.153 6.76 31.11 0.79 7.81 33.39 0.86 
Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment 0.070 0.037 0.027 0.124 7.96 26.89 0.75 8.53 31.03 0.71 
Automobile, Truck and Bus  0.056 0.023 0.032 0.104 6.92 31.16 0.83 7.85 33.51 0.87 
Wood Sawing and Wood Products  0.325 0.063 0.239 0.424 5.00 27.94 0.94 5.60 31.64 0.87 
Pulp and Paper Production, Paper 
Products, Printing and Publishing 0.134 0.048 0.062 0.208 7.80 28.54 0.70 8.16 31.66 0.76 
Rubber Products  0.071 0.037 0.012 0.153 6.37 30.01 0.76 7.11 32.56 0.85 
Non-petrochemical Chemical and 
Fertilizer  0.072 0.016 0.048 0.110 5.79 30.26 0.71 7.66 33.70 0.81 
Pharmaceutical, Perfumes, 
Detergents and Candles  0.103 0.028 0.063 0.181 8.23 30.64 0.56 9.02 32.13 0.62 
Plastics Products  0.094 0.028 0.047 0.148 6.39 29.05 0.69 7.05 31.30 0.66 
Textiles 0.104 0.030 0.055 0.187 5.71 29.71 0.47 6.66 31.34 0.59 
Apparel 0.260 0.040 0.186 0.335 6.19 30.72 0.19 6.68 31.11 0.22 
Footwear and leather products 0.181 0.030 0.115 0.233 5.62 29.45 0.47 6.16 28.87 0.57 
Coffee, Food, Beverage, Animal 
Feed and Tobacco  0.181 0.029 0.140 0.222 5.17 27.80 0.70 6.51 32.00 0.74 
 
Source: Brazilian PNAD data.  
Note: An informal worker is one whose employer does not comply with payroll taxes. 
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Table 3 - Formal-informal job transitions in Brazil between 1991 and 1996  
 
Share of people with at least 20 years old and 
working in 1991  
Employment status in May 1996 
Formal job Informal 
job 
Self-
employed 
Employers No-wage 
employment 
Totals 
Employment status 
in May 1991 
Formal  job 41.4% 10.1% 8.1% 1.4% 0.2% 61.2% 
Informal  job 4.9% 8.5% 2.9% 0.4% 0.1% 16.9% 
Self-employed 2.1% 2.4% 11.2% 1.8% 0.3% 17.8% 
Employers 0.3% 0.2% 0.9% 1.9% 0.1% 3.5% 
No-wage employment 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 
Non-declared 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 
  Totals 48.9% 21.4% 23.4% 5.5% 0.8% 100.0% 
 
Source: Data from the May 1996 special supplement of the PME (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego - Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey), in which 
every worker interviewed reported his/her formality status in 1991 and in 1996.  
Note: An informal worker is one whose employer does not comply with payroll taxes.  
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Figure 1 –Informality share in services and manufacturing in Brazil, 1984-2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PNAD data.  
Note: Dashed vertical line indicates the start of Brazil’s trade liberalization 
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Figure 2 – Wage (wi) and expected wage bill (bi) for formal and informal labor contracts 
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Figure 3 –Productivity (i) and wage (wi) space and firms’ choice of labor contracts and markets served in an 
open economy. 
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Appendix 
 
A.1 Comparative Statics 
Lemma 1. A sufficient condition for |
      
  
   
      
  
  is fx = f. 
Proof 
By differentiating equation (7) with respect to , I obtain  
  (     )
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∫ (
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  ( )
 
Given that sx,for > sopen, 
      
  
<0, and under the assumption that f = fx, the term multiplying 
      
  
 is positive and larger than one, I conclude that |
      
  
   
      
  
 . 
 
Lemma 2. A sufficient condition for |
      
   
   
      
   
  is fx = f. 
Proof 
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By differentiating equation (7) with respect to *, I obtain  
  (     )
      
      
   
  
  (      )
       
       
   
     
Notice that  
  (     )
      
 
   
     
∫ (
 
     
)
    
     
  ( ) 
Then,  
       
   
  
  (     )
      
      
   
 
  
(
  (      )
       
)
  
 
       
   
  
      
   
 
  
      
     
∫ (
 
     
)
   
 
     
  ( )
∫ (
 
      
)
   
 
     
  ( )
 
Given that sx,for > sopen, 
      
   
<0, and under the assumption that f = fx, the term multiplying 
      
   
 is positive and larger than one, I conclude that |
      
   
   
      
   
 . 
 
Proposition 2: A reduction in the Home import tariff decreases the share of informal workers 
in total industry employment if the sufficient conditions (S1)-(S4) hold, 
(  )    (  )     (  )   (   )
    (  )
  
 
   
 
 (  )
  (  )
  
   . 
 
Proof   I need to prove that 
      
  
 
      
      
      
  
 
      
      
      
  
>0. As discussed earlier, the 
sign of the last term is positive, but the sign of the first term is ambiguous. Let’s examine the sign of 
the first term in detail, since 
      
  
  . 
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 (             )  
       
      
       
       
      
        
Notice that the first term inside the curly brackets is positive, while 
      
      
>0. So the resulting 
sign of 
      
      
 is ambiguous. The proposition result requires  
      
      
 < 0, so the strategy adopted here is 
to find a term that can dominate 
       
      
      . This is done by looking at 
      
      
      
  
, where  
      
       
 (             )  
       
       
       
       
       
        
The first term inside the curly bracket is positive since 
       
      
  . The second term is also 
positive because 
      
      
  . So, 
      
      
  .  
The ambiguity can be solved if |
      
  
      
      
      |   
      
  
      
      
       . This means that 
the number of formal jobs along the sx,for line is larger than the number of formal jobs along the sopen 
line. For this to happen, we need |
      
  
   
      
  
  and |
      
      
|   
      
      
 . Condition (S2) with 
Lemma 1 guarantees that that the former inequality holds. The latter inequality is met if conditions 
(S3) and (S4) hold. The intuition is the following. For a given wage, as productivity increases two 
things happen. First, the firm employment level increases at the (-1)-1 rate. So, as long as the 
marginal density of productivity decreases at a slower rate, i.e.    (   )  
  (  )
  
 
   
 
, there 
will be more formal workers employed on firms lying on sx,for than on sopen.  
 
Proposition 3. A reduction in the Home import tariff leads to a decrease in the industry-level 
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average formal wage if the sufficient conditions (S1)-(S3) and the additional sufficient condition (S5) 
hold. 
(  )      (
 
    
)
   
 
  (   )
  
  
 
Proof   Notice that the derivative of the average formal wage with respect to Home import 
tariff is given by 
  ̅   
  
 (
  ̅   
      
      
  
 
  ̅   
       
       
  
)
   
  
 
The sign of 
  ̅   
  
 is given by the sign of the term inside the parentheses because 
   
  
  . 
    
  ̅   
  
      
       
      
      
  
  ̅   
      
      
      
  
 
       
      
      
  
  ̅   
      
      
      
  
     
The sign of the above expression can be determined by comparing the average formal wage 
with the average wage of the formal firms lying on the curve in which the derivative is calculated, in 
this case sopen and sx,for. For the sign of curly bracket term to be positive, we need the average formal 
wage along sopen to be larger than  ̅    and the average formal wage along sx,for to be smaller than 
 ̅     This is ensured by conditions (S1)-(S3) and (S5). Notice that condition (S5) is more restrictive 
than condition (S4). The intuition for conditions (S2) and (S3) is the same from Proposition 2. 
Condition (S5) means that for a fixed productivity level the decrease rate of the marginal density of 
the wage is faster than the rate of decrease in employment level due to higher wages. As a result, the 
average formal wage along sopen is larger than the average formal wage, which by its turn is larger 
than the average formal wage along sx,for.  
 
 45 
 
Proposition 4. A reduction in the Foreign import tariff (*) decreases the share of informal 
workers in total industry employment if the sufficient conditions (S1)-(S4) hold. 
 
Proof   In comparison with Proposition 2, the derivative of the share of informal of informal 
workers has an additional term which accounts for the change in the formal employment by the 
current exporters.  
      
   
 
      
      
      
   
 
      
       
       
   
 
       
   
 
A decrease in the Foreign import tariff leads to an expansion of the formal employment of the 
current exporters, hence 
       
   
>0. Given that 
      
   
   and 
      
   
  , the ambiguity is similar to 
the one discussed in Proposition 2. So, given condition (S2), Lemma 2 can be applied to arrive at 
|
      
   
|   
      
   
 . Then, the rest of the proof is similar to the one from Proposition 2.  
 
Proposition 5: A reduction in the Foreign import tariff leads to an increase in the industry-
level average formal wage if the conditions (S1)-(S3) and (S5) hold. 
 
Proof   In comparison with Proposition 3, the derivative of the average formal wage has an 
additional term which accounts for the change in the average formal wage due to changes in the 
employment level of the current exporters. 
  ̅   
   
 (
  ̅   
   
 
  ̅   
      
      
   
 
  ̅   
      
      
   
)
   
   
  
The sign of 
  ̅   
   
 is given by the opposite sign of the term inside the curly brackets since 
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    Thus the term inside the curly bracket has to be positive. 
   {
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}       
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  ̅   
       
       
       
  
   
The reasoning behind the proof here is similar to the reasoning used in Proposition 3. But 
now, condition (S2) allows the use of Lemma 2. As in Proposition 3, conditions (S3) and (S5) and 
Lemma 2 ensure that the sign of the last four terms of the curly bracket is positive. Now, we also 
need to have a positive sign for the first two terms, so the sign of the term in parentheses in equation 
(23) is positive. Notice that 
       
   
   and 
      
   
  , consequently the first two terms will be 
positive if the average formal wage of the exporters were smaller than the overall average formal 
wage. And this happens whenever conditions (S3) and (S5) hold. Thus, 
  ̅   
   
  , i.e. forw  increases 
with a decrease in *.  
 
A2. Case of Two Large asymmetric economies 
 Remember that Foreign is different from Home only in terms of the population. That said, I 
present first the Foreign economy equations, and then I discuss the general equilibrium equations 
presented before that need to be changed. 
 The demand faced by Foreign producers when they supply Foreign market is given by 
equation (25), and the demand faced by Foreign producers at Home market is given by equation (26). 
   
  [
   
 
  
]
  
           (25) 
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  [
   
 
 
]
  
          (26) 
 The Foreign firm zero cutoff profit (ZCP) for entry is shown in equation (27). Notice that from 
the ratio between equation (27) and equation (10), we obtain equation (28).  
  
   (     
 )     (        
 )        
       (27) 
        
      
 (       
  )
 
          (28) 
The free-entry condition for Foreign is depicted by equation (29). 
 (     
 )   (      
 )             (29) 
 The labor market clearing condition, the price index for Foreign, the unemployment equation, 
the expected wage distortion, and the government transfer equations are analogous to the ones 
presented earlier for the Home economy. The equations that need to be changed are the Home firms 
zero cutoff profit for exporting, and the Trade Balance equation, which are equations (30) and (31) 
respectively. 
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 (        ) 
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 (         )  
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     (        )
    (31) 
By recursive substitution, the general equilibrium depends only on W1 and sx,for, so the two 
equations needed are (9) and (31). And from Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2011) Lemma 1, there 
exists one equilibrium and it is unique. 
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A.3 Appendix for the Referees 
 
A.3.1 Efficiency wage problem with government transfers 
The flow value of a non-shirker worker employed at firm is given by equation (32), where   
  
 
. 
    
  
  
 
 
  
 
  (      
 )        (32) 
And the flow value of a shirker worker employed at firm i is  
    
     
  
 
 (    )(      
 ) 
Let’s impose the non-shirking condition,    
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 (    )  ] 
Next, I solve for    , and I obtain 
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]  
  
 
 
Let ̂   
   (   )(   )
   
. Isolating   in the previous equation leads to  
   
   
 ̂ 
 
  
 ̂  
         (33) 
Now, let’s calculate       , 
(      )[      ]       
  
 
 
  
 
 
Plugging     in the above equation, I obtain 
       
  
   
[
   
 
] 
For any firms with different i’s, using equation (33) I construct the wage ratios as shown below. 
  
  
 
 ̂ 
 ̂ 
 
  
  
 
Let’s the wage paid by the firm with monitoring ability ̅  be W1, then  
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 ̂̅
 ̂ 
   , and  
   
   
  
(   )(   )
 ̅    (   )(   ) 
   
It is now time to aggregate firm level variables in order to solve for the unemployment level. Given the 
wage density is common knowledge, we can calculate 
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]     
The flow value of being unemployed is given by  
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In equilibrium, unemployment inflow equal unemployment outflow, then 
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) 
Where b is the unemployment escape rate. 
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Plugging     into the wage equation, we obtain for firm i, 
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) (
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] 
Then for the firm with monitoring ability ̅ , we have 
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]
      [
  
  
]
], where    
 (   )
   ̂
 and ̂   
 ̅ (   )(   )
  ̅
 
Notice that Davis and Harrigan (2011) let r go to zero, as in Melitz (2003). 
